Platon Lebedev’s statement regarding the Vedomosti article.





When on 1 July of this year in Chita I read a Vedomosti article by I. Reznik, A. Nikolsky and F. Sterkin (Issue 115, Tuesday, 26.06.2007) under the title “What YUKOS had to hide.” (Why PwC withdrew their audits of the oil company), I decided to make the following statement through my lawyers regarding this article.



1. An earlier Vedomosti publication by I. Fedyukin and S. Ivanova “School friend helped Khodorkovsky” (Issue 204, Thursday, 06.11.2003) was subsequently used by so-called “investigation” (Karimov and Co) and the “Meshchansky court” as a proof (?) of my (?) guilt (?) when they were delivering the unjust verdict of 16.05.2005.

I think you are aware of attempts of Vedomosti lawyers to somehow bring the “court” to reason after this publication and of the result of these attempts.

2. Another publication in Vedomosti (Issue 73, Tuesday, 24.04.2007) was used by so-called “investigation” (Karimov and Co) and a “Chita court” on 29 June 2007 as a proof (?) of the need to detain (?) me (?) in the city of Chita (?).

Conclusion: so-called “investigation” and “courts” attach a lot of importance to Vedomosti publications, and therefore so do I owing to their consequences.



1. I doubt that Vedomosti were indeed “able to find out” , as they assert in the article, “why PWC has withdrawn all of its audits of YUKOS for the last ten years.”

But the withdrawal itself is an unprecedented fact, which is, of course, unpleasant and can have hardly predictable consequences.

I know (and I think you do, too) that after the “unique” decision of the Moscow Commercial Court (Judge P.A. Markova) of 27.03.2007, which accused PWC, among other things, in
- “misleading of Company shareholders”,
- “wrongful acts resulting in substantial harm to the society and the state”,
- “knowingly false audit report for 2004”,

and found four of its contracts with Yukos on auditing services (under Russian accounting principles) null and void, the Ministry for Finance at a “request” of the Federal Tax Service will “check” PWC.

We will see what will happen then.

However, it is obvious to me that the so-called “Yukos case” – an enormous heavy-handed fraudulent “scam” involving authorities – requires “wiping out” of all “traces” (including those of auditors of Yukos) as well as of the Company itself.

Conclusion: If by so doing PWC “takes the heat off” its employees (i.e. saves them from an unlawful criminal prosecution) – I can understand that.

2. I doubt that, as Vedomosti writes, “the client failed to disclose to the auditor [what auditor, I wonder?] some of its affiliated persons [what persons, I wonder?] and scopes of some payments [what payments, I wonder?] made prior [!!!]to privatization of YUKOS [i.e. before 1993 ?!], and that such information can be of any value for readers.

Because it confuses uninformed people even more and raises questions what and who all this is about in those informed.

Let me clarify: I doubt that “prior to privatization” (i.e. before 1993), PWC can be an auditor of Yukos, which was at that time a state company; moreover, the procedure for disclosure of information about affiliated entities in financial statements of Russian joint-stock companies appeared only seven years later, in 2000, owing to Regulation (Accounting Rules 11/2000) “Information about Affiliated Entities” approved by Order of the Ministry for Finance No. 54 of 13.01.2000.

3. I doubt [in view of my doubts from paragraph 2] that Douglas Miller, a professional auditor from PWC, could have used in his letter the term “affiliated persons” relating to Yukos Russian statements for 1998-1999, i.e. for the period specifically referred to by Vedomosti in their article.

The issue is that since Russian reporting started requiring this information (about affiliation) to be disclosed after 2000, Mr Miller’s letter could only have spoken about the term “connected parties” (IFRS 24), which is used when “consolidated financial statements” (IFRS 27) are prepared using international standards (IFRS or GAAP), and about its correct use by Yukos and PWC while preparing and auditing consolidated statements of the Company under US GAAP for 1998-1999 (if they were prepared at all).

[Now we know for sure that it was PWC who on 17 March 2000 signed South Petroleum Limited and Baltic Petroleum Trading Limited reports on trade of crude oil and petro-products (coming mostly from Yukos) by these companies in 1998 and 1999 for directors and management of these companies. Therefore, not only did Yukos not “conceal” information about this activity, but on the contrary, PWC might have had more information than Yukos upon the results of these audits (I’ll ask my lawyers to show these PWC reports to Vedomosti)].

4. I doubt that Mr Miller called Behles Petroleum S.A., Switzerland an “oil exporter” with regard to Yukos 1998-1999 contracts.

In fact, at the material time Behles Petroleum S.A. and Elf Trading S.A. from Switzerland and Total International Limited from Bermudas were main importers (80-90%) of oil exported by Yukos under pre-export funding projects, including those organised by several European and US banks.

5. I have a lot of doubts [in view of my doubts from items 1-4], that, as follows from the context and meaning of consistent reading of the article, “the court [which, I wonder?] found the activity of these companies [Behles (?) Baltic (?) South (?) these (?)]sham while the profits gained by them a taxable profit of YUKOS, writes Miller.”

I know that “these” foreign companies operate in jurisdiction of Switzerland, Ireland and Gibraltar; in view of this I’m very puzzled.

[I advise you to avoid phrases like “taxable profit of Yukos” in future.]



In order not to dull you with my “doubts”, please do me a favour and provide my defence attorneys (lawyers) with a copy of the letter from Mr Miller from PWC.

This “without any doubts” will allow us to give legal assessment to what have happened.



(as of the date of this statement or as of 02.07.2003 – the date of my arrest)

1. I personally am a Yukos minority shareholder. I own 14,089 shares (0.0000063%).

2. As of the day of my arrest (02.07.2003), I was a shareholder of international holding Group Menatep Ltd., Gibraltar (hereinafter - GML). I owned 348,101 shares (7%).

3. As of 02.07.2003, I, as the GML director, had a right to control, vote and manage the Yukos controlling stake (61%) in 2000-2003.

4. As of 02.07.2003, it was Ernst & Young that was the GML auditor. PWC has never been a GML auditor (although wanted to) and has never issued GML audits.

5. Neither GML, nor its subsidiaries, nor I (as the GML director) have ever owned a share (stake) in South or Baltic equity either directly or indirectly.

6. During some period (1998-1999), GML structures did not own the controlling stake (51%) in Yukos but (certainly) were among main shareholders of the Company.

7. As follows from, among other documents, the PWC audited Yukos statements, in 1999-2001 Yukos indeed participated (due to reputation risks) in restructuring of liabilities of the Menatep Bank, Moscow (hereinafter – BM) with various groups of the bank creditors.

Yukos would acquire BM’s debts to these banks in exchange of Yukos’s long-term liabilities. In 2000-2002, GML structures bought all BM’s debts from Yukos to Yukos’s benefit.

The GML structures wrote off the cost they incurred (~ USD 0.5 bln.) as losses.

8. It follows from PWC audit reports that:

à) PWC knew very well that Yukos Brokerage Ltd (a subsidiary of Yukos (UK) Ltd, which was in turn a wholly owned Yukos subsidiary) in 1998-1999 rendered brokerage services to South Petroleum Trading Ltd. when the latter was selling crude oil on the market to oil traders from J&S Services, BP Oil, Elf, Total, Crown Trade and Finance, Sintez, Naftex, Mark Rich, Moltrade, Petraco Oil Company Ltd., etc.

á) PWC also knows very well that brokerage service rendering is not a characteristic of “connected parties” (“affiliated persons”). Some economic dependence arising from this (due to big transactions) and natural coordination of counteragents’ activities are not characteristics of “connected parties” (“affiliated persons”) either.

9. Services that I myself rendered (including for a fee) in 1999-2001 on restructuring of BM’s debts to its numerous creditors – including Baltic and South, who became its creditors without me expecting this due to some business miscalculations of their management – were not a subject of Yukos audit by PWC.

However, restructuring of BM liabilities and its results were absolutely public (for instance, it was covered on central TV channels), and I didn’t conceal this from anybody.

On 19 June 2001, I held a public conference in Moscow “The Menatep Bank: Bankruptcy Story. Myths and Reality”, which was attended by PWC representative among more than 300 guests.

10. My personal friendly help to the management and owners of South and Baltic (D. Ryan, P. Bond, S. Curtis, K. Samuelson and others) in settling business disagreements between them as well as problems with counteragents (brokers, traders, financial agents, etc.) could not have been a subject of Yukos audit by PWC either, let alone belonging to the area of expertise or jurisdiction of the so-called “investigation” (Karimov and Co.).

I don’t know about any complaints about me from the managements and owners of these companies except for their gratitude.

11. It is widely known that in 2001-2002 GML structures voluntarily paid compensation to former BM creditors totalling RUR 4 bln, including RUR 2.2 bln. to the Federal Budget (the Ministry for Finance), and waived more than RUR 4 bln. of BM debtors’ debts.

12. Files of so-called “investigation” (Karimov and Co.) contain Statements of Yukos management [CFO Michael Soublin (1999-2001, subsequently a Yukos Director), CFO Bruce Misamore (2001-2004), V.S. Shakhnosky, M.B. Khodorkovsky] to PWC upon results of the audits.

Having read them, I as the GML Director (1998-2003) think that they are correct and exhausting, since I’m not aware of any information that would refute their Statements.


(from a minority shareholder)

1. Does PWC understand who (!) really benefits from all this now, in 2007?

2. Why now (in 2007) PWC thinks that the information known to it and Yukos management is [as can be inferred from the article] relevant and material, and why it (the information) was not [as can be understood] reflected in Yukos financial statements under US GAAP?

3. Did this [see Question 2] somehow affect (or could have affected) the accurateness of Yukos financial statements and intents of investors (users of these statements)?

4. Why after numerous interrogations, searches, etc. (in 2007) PWC called into question inherent auditors’ principles of impartiality and neutrality of information? [Risk of loosing the licence - ? or …?]

Annex: The Menatep Bank: Bankruptcy Story. Myths and Reality. – Moscow, 2001; audits; letter of reference concerning Chairman of ZAO MFO Menatep Board P.L. Lebedev.

With the greatest regard,
Good luck.

2-3 July 2007, Chita
P.L. Lebedev.