The authorities propose Khodorkovsky’s strategy for Russia

Alexander Grishin, Delovye lyudi, 20.05.2008

Since the launch of the Putin Plan one key question remains unanswered: Who will carry it out? As the former president himself admitted: “To a great extent our State officials form part of a bureaucratic and corrupt system that is not motivated to engage in positive change, let alone dynamic development”.

Yet if this enormous army of clerks and administrators, numbering more than 25 million persons, does not agree with Putin’s demands that they be “responsive to the market, receive payment by results not for the fact of their existence”, what then? And what if they are also unwilling to “take personal responsibility for the quality of their work”?

Sounds familiar

Anyway, what is this “Putin Plan” and where did it come from? When I entered the term in my internet browser, and then the phrase “2020 Programme”, I unexpectedly found answers — and not just to those questions. The “2020 Programme” promptly appeared, subtitled by its author a “social or social liberal” programme.

Due to commence in 2008, “it is intended to cover a period of twelve years. That is a reasonable deadline for its implementation. We should not regard twelve years as ‘three presidential terms’: the programme can only be implemented efficiently if there is a change in the political system of Russia, namely its conversion to ą presidential-parliamentary republic. Under such a model the President would be the moral leader, the guarantor of the country’s unity and the commander-in-chief; the President would be the direct overseer of the law enforcement agencies and be at the centre of foreign policy. The whole range of economic and social issues, meanwhile, should be dealt with by a government, formed by the Duma and responsible to parliament for the results of its work.”

This seems very similar to what President Putin said, when explaining to journalists the forthcoming division of responsibilities. Yet the words just quoted were published in the Kommersant daily newspaper on 11 November 2005. There was not one publication, in fact, but four articles between March 2004 and November 2005. “The time has come for us to ask ourselves what we have done for Russia,” wrote the author of that earlier programme. “We have to prove, to ourselves first and foremost, that we are not temporary residents but that this land is our home. We must cease to act as if we do not care about the interests of our country and our people. Those interests are our interests.” In February this year, meanwhile, Vladimir Putin declared as one of the principles of his programme for the development of Russia until 2020: “Whatever our disagreements all public bodies in the country must act according to a simple but vitally important principle: do nothing to the detriment of Russia and its citizens, do everything for the benefit of Russia, its national interests and the well-being and safety of each citizen in Russia”. Our 2005 author is convinced, no matter how fantastic it may sound, that from 2008 onwards Russia has no alternative but to begin creating an innovative, modernised, new economy: otherwise our country “will never become a modern, well-developed and respected state, and is likely to collapse during our lifetime. As citizens of Russia we cannot calmly accept our country’s disintegration, neither shall we.”

When launching his plan, Putin asserted that if Russia followed the present, non-innovative, mineral-based scenario for economic growth “we shall not make the necessary progress in raising the quality of life of Russia’s citizens. Furthermore, we shall be unable to ensure either the security of the country or its normal development. We put its very existence at risk, and I say so without any exaggeration.”

On 11 November 2005 almost every key economic assumption in the Putin Plan was already being spelled out by the author of the Kommersant article. Entitled “Left Turn 2”, it was published by a prisoner at penal colony YaG 14/10 in Krasnokamensk. His name, Mikhail Khodorkovsky.

Chita has less time to waste?

This is certainly not the first time that the domestic, and above all the economic, policies of Russia have coincided with the plans and business ventures of Mikhail Khodorkovsky. It was Yukos that first wanted to build its own oil pipeline to the Pacific coast. Some time later Yukos ceased to exist and Russia began to build the East Siberian-Pacific pipeline. It is following almost the same route apart from Putin’s decision to move the pipeline one hundred kilometres to the north in order not to put the invaluable wildlife potential of Lake Baikal at risk. Many thanks to Vladimir Putin for that decision. “Irrespective of whether we like Vladimir Putin or not, it is time we realised that the head of state is not just an individual,” wrote Khodorkovsky in March 2004: “The president is an institution that guarantees the country's territorial integrity and stability. ... Russian history teaches us that a bad regime is still better than no regime.”

In the same article Khodorkovsky commented: “It is time we realised that for civil society to develop it is not only necessary, it is essential that the authorities give a lead. The infrastructure of civil society takes shape over centuries: it does not arise at the wave of some magic wand”. On 13 September 2004 Vladimir Putin suggested the creation of the Public Chamber, so that civil society might monitor the activities of the authorities.

And giving priority to the development of East Siberia and the Russian Far East? Khodorkovsky was also a pioneer among contemporary analysts of that proposal. This is what he wrote in November 2005: “It is important to preserve Russia’s territory and consolidate its current borders. One way to ensure this is to carry out significant investment programs in East Siberia and the Russian Far East. To achieve this objective requires the creation of large-scale centres of Russian business activity in the East and beyond the Urals. The scale of investment programs, to be financed both by private capital and private-public partnerships, should reach $200 billion within 10-15 years.” However, implementation of the Federal Programme for the development of the Russian Far East and the Transbaikal Region after 1996 remained patchy. Until, that is, January 2007 when Putin demanded that it be re-examined, extended to 2013, and given priority.

There are also differences between the two conceptions, it is true. Khodorkovsky sets a completion date for achievement in 2020. He considers it is essential to attain an economy with the following structure: “40%, ‘knowledge economy’; 40%, oil, gas, metal, licensed production; 20%, agriculture, including processing and trade.” Apart from the figures quoted in the text, the Putin Plan includes several other indicators. In particular, a growth in life expectancy and an increase in the proportion of the middle class in Russia’s population.

No competition

I’m far from suggesting that Putin actually read, let alone creatively reworked, Khodorkovsky’s proposals. Presidents do not draw up strategies. They have teams of analysts and experts for that purpose. All the president does is to choose, selecting one of many versions.

So what were these analysts and experts up to? If they read Khodorkovsky’s articles then it was plagiarism and an inability to produce something of their own. If they did not, then it shows their backwardness. Offering something that a prisoner put forward two and a half years ago is in doubtful taste and a confession of one’s own impotence. In November 2005 Khodorkovsky wrote: “we need a real modernization project for Russia. Without that, the country will simply not survive in the new century. It will not be able to meet its objective historical challenges. The outlines of this project are already visible.” Almost two and half years later we were told: “We have only begun to modernise parts of our economy ... if we pursue such a scenario we shall not make the necessary progress in raising the quality of life of Russia’s citizens,” and so on. Some may object that there are no alternatives to the route laid down in the Putin Plan. The analysts advising the authorities, in other words, themselves reached such conclusions. Who then was putting forward the idea, only eighteen months ago, that Russia should be an energy and raw materials superpower?

Here we return to the question with which I began. Who will implement the Putin Plan? If it is left to the officials there is little chance of success. Either they will “creatively rework” the plan or they will take too much time thinking it over or reaching decisions. This is what Khodorkovsky says: “My critics claim that the country lacks the human resources to carry out such large-scale transformations. During such reforms, everything will either be wrecked or stolen. I could not disagree more. Representatives of the current ruling elite judge everything and everyone by their own standards. I have had the experience of building the largest Russian corporation, Yukos. ... In all areas of work we selected: ą) the best people; b) wherever possible, young people (under 35). ... All that is necessary is to formulate the right criteria for selecting staff: Russia has always been rich in talent and always will be.”

PS Did Khodorkovsky write every word himself? If not he is still at an advantage because, when time is so crucial, he found clever people and publicised the right idea two and a half years before others.